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ABSTRACT 
Network-based information hiding is possible in even the most adverse conditions 
such as when an active i.;varden reduces packets into a canonical form and enforces protocol 
specification. Covert channels in the TCP/IP protocol suite are surveyed from the network 
layer up to the application layer which is given special emphasis. Active wardens are 
discussed in detail, as those network devices attempt to thwart covert communications. 
Application layer hiding techniques are gaining popularity and can be viewed as a 
response to active wardens. However, even the best application layer techniques tend to be 
confined to a particular protocol. We define the theoretical foundations for a new scheme in 
which bitwise summations of application layer messages convey covert bits. 
A set of large HTTP queries is taken from Internet Traffic Archive for analysis. Two 
bitwise summation methods, an ad-hoc and a blind (cryptographic), are compared using the 
Web repository. The viability of both methods is established, though the cryptographic 
findings are more conclusive. 
Following the test results, a client/server model is outlined that utilizes either the ad-
hoc or the blind method for covert communication. Development of a functioning prototype 
based on that model is described as well. The client, called tcphalm for hide application 
layer messages, can communicate without the requirement of superuser privileges by 
gathering socket messages through system call interposition. The server, tcphalmd, only 
supports the HTTP protocol but is demonstrative enough so that other application protocols 
can easily be incorporated into the code. 
Finally, future work is discussed which includes steps concerned network 
administrators can take to combat application layer hiding techniques. However, because 
Vil 
hiding techniques can be adapted to handle such countermeasures, the covert messaging arms 
race will likely continue well into the future. For now, information hiding methods that 
employ bitwise summations enjoy a sizeable advantage over active wardens. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
A covert messaging technique does not exist that is both resistant to active wardens 
and general enough to he applied across various application layer protocols. 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
The first chapter surveys network information hiding techniques. An overview is 
given of covert channels in the TCP/IP protocol suite and associated terminology. Methods 
others have used to hide information in the top three layers are discussed. The application 
layer hiding techniques are emphasized because of their strong relation to this work. 
Chapter two describes our hypothesis for hiding data inside bitwise summations of 
socket messages. Mathematical formulas are provided for illustration purposes. Practical 
limitations inherent in bitwise summation hiding schemes are mentioned as well as a couple 
of possible remedies. 
The third chapter covers methods used to test the bitwise summation hypothesis. The 
problems encountered 1with gathering a dataset are outlined followed by a description of 
several tests and their results. Chapter three concludes with analysis of the bitwise summation 
test results. 
Chapter four examines a client/server model that was built to allow bitwise 
summation-based covert messaging to occur over a network. The constraints and goals of the 
model are discussed in detail. The construction of a functional C++ prototype derived from 
the model is covered next. Limitations surrounding the client and server are discussed. 
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Finally, chapter five suggests a few areas for future work in bitwise summations as 
well as the field of information hiding in general. The paper concludes with a summary of our 
work in which some overall conclusions are drawn. 
1.3 Overview of Network Covert Channels 
Covert channels within software systems or on a single machine have been well-
studied during the past two decades. [ 1] provides a good summary of the work done in that 
area. However, for the purposes of this paper, we examine only network covert channels -
that is, covert channels 'Nithin the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
suite. Information hiding in the application layer, which is the focus of this work, builds upon 
only that faction of covert channels. 
A communication system is comprised of subjects and objects. For illustration 
purposes, the subjects, the sender and receiver, are generally defined to be Alice and Bob. 
The objects are whatever data containers Alice and Bob use to communicate. Figure 1 below 
depicts the typical communication scenario. 






Figure I - Covert Communications 
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An example of an object is the source address in an IP packet. Alice marks the source 
address to indicate to Bob that she is the sender. In this case, the source address is referred to 
as an overt channel. The source address is overt in the sense that the designers of the TCP/IP 
specification intended for that field to hold data. 
Covert channels, on the other hand, are formed through the use of objects that were 
not intended to be data containers [ 1]. An example of an unintended container is the payload 
of TCP segments with the Reset (RST) flag set. According to the TCP/IP specification, RST 
segments should contain no data, as they are only intended to abort communications. 
However, a nefarious user with a means to craft custom packets can certainly break 
specification to include data in the payload [2]. 
Notably, covert channels require that a trusted subject collaborates with an untrusted 
subject to leak information. In that way, covert channels can be used by crackers to get 
around access control lists (ACLs). Covert channels, then, concern many network 
administrators [ 1 ]. 
In recent years, the more descriptive term information hiding has been used in lieu of 
network covert channels [3][4][5]. Alternatively, Internet steganography has also been 
employed to the same end. For the remainder of this work, we use the more contemporary 
term information hiding [2][4][6]. 
1.4 Overview of Information Hiding in TCP/IP 
Handel and Sandford noted that "functionality is present that can be exploited" in all 
layers of the TCP/IP model for the purposes of information hiding. The lower TCP/IP layers 
are ignored in this work, as they cannot span subnets. We focus instead on the remaining 
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layers : network, transport, and application. The application layer will be be given the most 
consideration due to the strong relation to our work [5]. 
In the TCP/IP protocol suite, two varieties of objects exist that Alice and Bob may 
use to communicate. The first is called the structured carrier because objects of that kind 
are comprised of data -with "syntax and semantics." Syntax refers to the way data is 
organized into a structure. For example, an IP packet consists of a series of header fields such 
as the Version field which is the header's first four bits. 
Semantics refers to the way that certain types of data adhere to (or are supposed to) 
some rules or interpretations. Currently, the only IP Version field values that make semantic 
sense are 4 and 6. All of the header fields in the TCP/IP protocol are examples of structured 
earners. 
An unstructured carrier will have syntax but not semantics. Unstructured carriers are 
typically media or multimedia objects such as images, audio, and video. Unstructured 
carriers have syntax because they are arranged in a data format such as JPEG and GIF in the 
case of images. However, they do not have semantics, as their data is just a stream of bits that 
is not constrained to a limited set of meaningful values. 
Unstructured carriers reside only in the application layer. Information hiding in 
unstructured carriers is referred to as steganography and the use of steganography to transmit 
messages across networks as subliminal channels [2]. 
The better TCP/IP information hiding schemes are designed to be difficult to detect 
through automated means but generally fail human scrutiny [7]. Therefore, TCP/IP hiding 
techniques typically utilize fields that are unlikely to be modified by routers and do not hold 
significant meaning according to the TCP/IP specification. For example, the Sequence and 
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Acknowledgment fields in TCP segments are poor choices as data containers; those fields are 
not arbitrary and "reflect the number of bytes sent and acknowledged" [4]. 
The following sections detail a number of TCP/IP information hiding techniques 
beginning at the network layer and proceeding upward. Following the transport layer 
techniques is a digression into active wardens, a very important topic in information hiding. 
Finally, all publicly available application layer techniques will be described. Because many 
information hiding methods put information into "header fields values that are incorrect, 
unreasonable, or even outside specification" [8], those techniques will only be mentioned in 
pass mg. 
1.5 Network Layer 
1.5.1 Do not F'ragment Bit 
The Do not Fragment (DF) flag, which is a single bit in the IP header, can be used for 
information hiding purposes. The flag only has meaning if the maximum transmission unit 
(MTU) size of one of the networks between the sender and receiver is smaller than the packet 
size. When the packet size exceeds a network's MTU, the packet should be fragmented if DF 
is set to 0. IfDF is set to 1, the packet should be dropped and an ICMP error returned. 
However, if the packet's size is less than the MTU of all networks from the sender to 
the receiver, DF has no meaning, as the packet never faces fragmentation. Consequently, the 
DF can be used as a single bit channel so long as packets are kept small enough so as not to 
be fragmented. However, hiding information in the DF flag is noticeable by an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) as the field tends to be consistent across packets normally [4]. 
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1.5.2 IP Identification Field 
Craig Rowland published code in 1996 to hide information inside the IP 
Identification field [9]. Rowland's code won't be detailed as the Identification field has 
semantic meaning, and a decent IDS should report unexpected field values. Essentially, 
Rowland's program just sets the 16 bit field to an arbitrary value. 
1.5.3 IP Header Checksum 
Christopher Abad's paper on the IP Checksum field explores information hiding using 
collisions in the 16 bit checksum used by Internet protocols [ 1 O] [ 11]. Transmitting 
information with collisions requires a known number of hops between sender and receiver. 
Also, collision detection is trivial with an IDS. 
1.5.4 ICMP D:ata 
Details of the Loki ICMP information hiding software are available in Phrack, an 
online hacker magazine. Loki tacks covert messages onto the data section of ICMP 
ECHO_ REQUEST and ECHO_ REPLY messages. The ICMP _ECHO/REPLY method is 
another example of an easily detected network layer information hiding technique. ICMP 
data should only be used to record packet routing or "to store timing information [in order] to 
determine round-trip times". An IDS would only have to examine contents of the ICMP data 
to detect anomalies [12][13]. 
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1.6 Transport Layer 
1.6.1 TCP Time Stamps 
Arguably the most secure of the techniques to hide information within TCP/IP header 
data uses TCP time stamps. TCP time stamps are viable for information hiding because they 
are often used in normal communications. Also, the low order time stamp bit varies 
considerably between packets (for slower Internet connections only) possessing a frequency 
distribution similar to random data. 
In that way, the TCP time stamp method gains a significant advantage over similar 
information hiding techniques. Other methods generally encrypt covert data for security 
which the time stamp method also does. However, the normal frequency characteristics of 
other TCP/IP header fields - even in their low order bits - are mostly nonrandom. Therefore, 
alternate hiding methods perturb the statistical distribution of their cover fields which creates 
a noticeable "high entropy signature". 
The TCP time stamp algorithm works as follows. The sender and receiver share a 
secret key K. The secret key is fed into a cryptographic hash along with a nonce t formed by 
concatenating the high order bits of the TCP time stamp and several fields in the TCP header. 
The hash results are taken modulus the block size 1 to produce a number n as shown in 
Equation 1.1 from [8]. The number is used to choose a particular bit of the covert message to 
send as the low order bit of the TCP time stamp. The n bit is XOR'ed by a bit randomly 
selected from K. 
Equation I. I n=h(t, K) (mod 1) 
TCP can guarantee reliable delivery of bytes but cannot ensure "the reliable delivery 
of individual packets." Therefore, the sender cannot rely on TCP to deliver all timestamps 
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without errors. A solution to this problem is for the sender to rely on probability to decide 
when a message has arrived. 
The sender does this by calculating the probability p that a message will arrive given a 
fixed drop rated when the occupancy (the number of times a packet sent) is o. The sender 
increases the occupancy by sending each bit of the message multiple times until pis 
sufficiently large enough that a successful delivery is likely. The formula to compute p from 
[8] is provided below. 
Equation 1.2 p=(l-do)l 
The receiver will be sent each bit of the message the occupation number of times. 
However, the receiver need not keep track of how many times a bit is received. The time 
stamp implementation calls for a thirty-two bit checksum to be appended to the end of the 
message. For each bit sent, the receiver computes a checksum. The process ends when the 
receiver's computed checksum agrees with the transmitted checksum. 
Of course, the low order bit must be congruent to the time it takes a packet to enter 
the network. The time stamp method alters the operating system to hold onto packets until the 
desired value of the bit arrives. Introducing a slight delay in packet processing guarantees that 
the low order bit varies logically between packets. Also, care must be taken to ensure that 
timestamps are "monotonically increasing." 
Despite the high security offered by using TCP time stamps as a cover, the method 
does have a few drawbacks. Particularly, changing the time stamp breaks its functionality in 
performance analysis. The time stamp method is also not much more robust than other 
TCP/IP information hiding schemes. An active warden, described later, could theoretically 
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insert zeros into the 10\v order time stamp bits of all TCP segments. Finally, timestamps only 
have random properties for dial up Internet connections [8]. 
1.6.2 Sequence and Acknowledgment Fields 
In addition to the IP Identification field, Craig Rowland suggested using the TCP 
Sequence and Acknowledgment fields to hide data. Rowland's implementation, coverttcp, 
merely changes the fields' values to reflect covert messages. As mentioned earlier, sequence 
and acknowledgment numbers are supposed to communicate a byte count, so the method is 
again vulnerable to an IDS or active warden [9]. 
1. 7 Active Wardens 
Active wardens are network devices that block covert channels and are contrasted 
with passive wardens \Vhich only detect covert channels. Active wardens, which are similar 
in functionality to firevvalls, are placed between communicating hosts. In keeping with the 
Alice and Bob scenario previously outlined, Wendy the warden is inserted between the two 
communicating subjects as shown in Figure 2 on the following page. 
Active wardens operate on the principle of what Fisk et. al call Minimum Requisite 
Fidelity (MRF). MRF is the least amount of fidelity necessary for communications to 
function normally. An active warden abides by MRF and adds enough noise to close covert 
channels without breaking communication. MRF can be defined formally with structured 
carriers but is subjective and harder to define in unstructured carriers. Typically, MRF in 









Sender Warden Receiver 
Figure 2-Active Warden 
1.7.1 Active \Vardens - Unstructured Carriers 
Active wardens that operate upon unstructured carriers employ statistical analysis to 
identify the presence of information hiding. These devices can also introduce noise to the 
carriers to try to close channels. For example, color images could be converted to 
monochrome by a warden. Of course, subliminal channels are hard to close completely 
which produces an arms race between the subjects and Wendy. 
For a simple arms race scenario, suppose Alice realizes that Wendy is converting 
images into monochrome and begins applying steganography to monochrome images instead 
of color ones. Wendy would then have to figure out another means to prevent Alice and Bob 
from communicating and the cycle continues [2]. 
1.7.2 Active Wardens - Structured Carriers 
Active wardens for structured carriers sanitize the fields in the TCP/IP protocol suite. 
In other words, the goal of an active warden is to reduce both inbound and outbound packets 
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to a canonical form thereby blocking TCP/IP protocol fields from being used as structured 
carriers. A sanitized packet is obtained by enforcing protocol specifications. 
One way an active warden enforces specification adherence is to fix the value of 
unused fields to a single value across packets. Also, fields that are derived from packet 
statistics like the header length and checksum are verified for correctness. Of course, 
anomalous network messages such as TCP RST segments with payload data will be dropped 
or reduced to a proper fonn. 
As is the case \Vith unstructured carriers, completely eliminating information hiding 
in structured carriers is an arms race. Alice could, for instance, segment messages to Bob in 
such a way that the length of the packet data could indicate a 0 or a 1. Wendy is then forced 
to undergo the laborious task of reassembling and resegmenting messages before Bob's 
reception. Active wardens are clearly not a perfect solution to TCP/IP information hiding but 
are very effective against many of the schemes already outlined [2]. 
1.8 Application Layer 
Nearly all research in information hiding in the TCP/IP suite delivers a small 
bandwidth that can be detected or blocked by an active warden. Application layer techniques, 
however, tend to be more sophisticated. Additionally, a plethora of application layer 
protocols exist, many of which are proprietary, making active wardens less effective at 
blocking information hiding in the top layer [ 6]. Indeed, disallowing "Bob and Alice the 
ability to communicate electronically may be the only absolute solution" to covert messaging 
[5]. 
12 
While application layer hiding schemes generally create more problems for active 
wardens, they are not aU created equally. Particularly, schemes that employ redundancy of 
some kind are theoretically vulnerable to an active warden. As with TCP/IP redundant fields, 
an active warden only has to rewrite the redundant application layer data to a single value 
and the scheme breaks. The synonym and software hiding techniques described below suffer 
from this problem. However, no publicly available active wardens exist to prevent 
information hiding for those two schemes specifically. 
1.8.1 Network Drives 
According to [5], the first known example of information hiding in the application 
layer dates back to the early 1980s. Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories noted that 
network drives could be used to pass covert messages back and forth. Alice could transmit Os 
to Bob by reading even numbered files on his remote drives and ls by reading odd numbered 
files. 
1.8.2 Word Synonyms 
Handel and Sandford also introduced another information hiding technique in [5]. 
Alice and Bob can share a lookup table of synonyms to communicate. Alice sends one 
variant of a word to Bob to mean a 02 and another to mean a 12. Words that have no 
synonyms can simply be ignored. For example, the word 'jump" can be assigned a 02 and 
"hop" a lz. The synonym technique is well-suited for email messages. 
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1.8.3 DNS Namelookup/Reply 
Loki-2 uses "DNS namelookup query I reply traffic" to send information. Although 
[13] does not document the technique, a quick glance at the source code reveals that DNS 
queries and replies are populated with encrypted covert messages. The data hiding method is 
essentially the same as the one in the ICMP _ECHO and ICMP _REPLY section; fill a 
payload with invalid data and assume no one is watching. 
Filling DNS lookups with encrypted data is easy to detect. Normal queries and replies 
have nonrandom data. Plus, a signature can be constructed for the amount of DNS queries a 
user normally transmits. Loki-2 would easily violate that threshold. Thus, an active warden 
could spot Loki-2 by looking for encrypted and excessive queries/replies [13]. 
DNS, though, is a ripe application layer protocol for covert messaging. Valid DNS 
entries could be mapped to covert bits using an information hiding scheme similar to the one 
covered in the HTTP Queries section later. Covert messages within legitimate DNS entries 
could be very hard to detect through automated means. 
1.8.4 SSH 
A recent paper by professors at Syracuse University examined using Secure Shell 
(SSH) for information hiding. SSH is an application layer protocol primarily designed for 
remote but secure command line-based system administration. SSH was studied for 
information hiding purposes, as the protocol generates commonplace network traffic that is 
encrypted and therefore not "subject to traffic analysis." 
The SSH packet sirncture is shown in Figure 3 from [6] below. The Packet Length 
field is the number of bytes in the Packet Data field. Padding Length is size of the Random 
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Padding which is used for byte alignment. The Packet Data field is the actual SSH message, 
and the Message Authentication Code (MAC) is normally a cryptographic hash of the Packet 
Data and the TCP Sequence Number. 
P ktF ac e tfi 0 SH 11 onna or,) essa ges -
Packet Padding Packet Data Random 11.AC 
Length Length Padding 
-... J .. : • .fiC ted- ... Plamtext 
Figure 3 - SSH Packet Format 
Several schemes exist to hide information in SSH packets. An encrypted message 
can be substituted for the Random padding and MAC fields, as modifying those fields will 
not break the SSH protocol. However, replacing the MAC requires altering the SSH client 
and server software to ignore MAC computations. 
Because the absence of a cryptographic hash weakens security, a safer method is to 
have the SSH client negotiate a hash of the maximum supported size of 20 bytes but actually 
use a hash algorithm with a smaller output. The difference between 20 bytes and the bytes 
needed by the chosen hash algorithm becomes the number of covert bytes possible. 
SSH also allows additional strings to be tacked onto the authentication message 
(located within the Packet Data field). The authentication message is where the client proves 
itself to the server before an SSH session can begin. Of course, the authentication portion of 
an SSH session is very brief which limits the usefulness for data hiding. 
Finally, a covert message that is encrypted can be tacked onto the front of a SSH 
packet, but the message must respect the 35,000 byte maximum of the protocol specification. 
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A prototype exists that uses a 4 byte magic number to indicate a covert message 
accompanied by 12 bytes of actual covert data. Only 16 bytes in total, then, are attached, 
since more data might perturb the statistics of SSH packet lengths [6]. 
SSH may be pem1issible traffic in most networks. However, the fact that SSH 
encrypts data may arouse suspicion in a high-security environment. For example, a network 
may contain an IDS that records the use of encrypted packets. SSH techniques are useless in 
such a circumstance. 
1.8.5 Software 
Information hiding within executable code can be used to hide data in a roundabout 
way. For instance, Alice and Bob can transfer programs embedded with messages to each 
other through email attachments or file transfers. As of this writing, one project, Hydan, 
supports the hiding of information in executables. 
The aim of Hydan is to "embed information using functionally-equivalent 
instructions." Instructions which differ only semantically are assigned bit values. In that 
sense, Hydan uses equivalent instructions in much the same way that Handel and Sandford 
use synonyms. 
Some examples of "functionally-equivalent instructions" are the add and subtract 
functions which can be arranged to have equivalent meanings. For instance, adding the 
number ten to another number is functionally the same as subtracting negative ten. 
Hydan has a fo"v intrinsic limitations. The current channel capacity is only 1 covert 
bit for every 110 bits of code. The bit rate is low due to the fact that the distribution of 
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redundant instructions must be respected. In other words, programs need to have a reasonable 
number of add and subtract instructions. 
Also, "there is no way to protect against overwriting all potentially hidden data by 
randomly permuting any instruction or other aspect of the binary that could be used by 
Hydan." In other words, an active warden could theoretically break Hydan. However, a 
substantial amount of processing would be required for that feat [14]. 
1.8.6 HTTP Queries 
To date, the best of the application layer information hiding techniques is the one used 
by the Infranet project. Infranet is a client-server system designed to get around the content 
restriction of proxy firewalls -particularly, China's so-called "Great Firewall". Therefore, 
Infranet's focus is on finding ways to hide information inside of HTTP traffic without using 
suspicion-generating cryptography. 
lnfranet is composed of a client called an Infranet requester and a server called an 
Infranet responder. The requester communicates covertly with the responder using Uniform 
Resource Locators (URLs). The requester sends an overt URL, a cover, that really exists on 
the responder but actually represents a fragment of a covert URL. In other words, valid URLs 
sent by the requester are mapped to hidden URLs by the responder. 
An Infranet responder delivers the content of websites found at the covert URLs 
through steganography. The Outguess program is used to embed website content in images 
that are part of HTTP responses to overt URLs. Consequently, the asymmetry of Web traffic 
is maintained; the upstream stays much smaller than the downstream. However, the use of 
back-end steganography makes Infranet susceptible to active wardens. 
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The details of the Infranet application layer hiding scheme are as follows. The 
requester uses an initial mapping function Uirut to modulate the transmission of a secret key 
SKEY onto a series of HTTP requests. SKEY is signed with the requester's public key as 
shown in the first step of Figure 4 below. Uiru1can be a known function or one the responder 
sends with image steganography after a handshake such as the requester asking for the index 
page. 
The responder replies to the secret key transmission by sending U1unne1, a requester-
specific function signed by SKEY that replaces Uirut fo.r more discreet messaging. Uirut and 
Uiunnei break up covert URLs into message fragments and choose covers that convey those 
fragments. The responder receives the covers and transforms them back into message 
fragments and eventually a covert URL. Uiunnet is sent in the second step of Figure 4 along 
with a number of URLs vv'hich are described later. 
As already mentioned, once all the fragments have arrived, the responder acts as a 
proxy by issuing a HTTP request using the covert URL. The results are returned to the 
requester through image steganography, as shown in the last step of Figure 4. 
reque;t~~HITP u n:;o (SKEY)) esponder ~· requests .. 1._.i...;.·s 
~~--- Irll1 enrer 
HITP reponse with E CU: I UR.Ls ink) SKEY tunnel 
in stego images 
HTTP requests with UR.LS ink (U~1(k)) that 
corrununicate the range of a covert URL 
HTTP Response with EsKEY(Result offorvvarded 
http request from covert URL) in stego irnages 
Figure 4 - lnfranet Operations 
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Unlike the downstream subliminal channel, lnfranet's upstream functions, Urn1 and 
U1unne1, are real application layer hiding functions and are very secure. Uirnt and Uiunnel use a 
form of range mapping that takes into account one hop statistics to associate HTTP requests 
with covert URL fragments. One hop statistics, formally defined as p( current URL I previous 
URL), provide "statistical deniability for the requester by making it more likely that the 
requester will take a path through the site that would be taken by an innocuous Web client." 
The range mapping involves the responder sending the requester a series of URLs 
from the set of URLs k that have a one hop probability greater than 0 as shown in the first 
transmission in Figure 4. Each of the URLs ink communicates a subset of the range of all 
lexicographically ordered strings. The greater the probability of an overt URL in k naturally 
occurring, the greater the size of the range of strings the URL designates. The requester 
responds with a series of URLs that together form the range that communicates the covert 
URL, the third step in Figure 4. The reader is referred to [15] for a complete and formal 
description of Infranet's range mapping. 
Infranet has a sufficient bandwidth for URL hiding. In fact, the authors found that 
"90% of all hidden requests [are communicated] in 10 visible HTTP requests." Of course, the 
Outguess-based subliminal channel's bandwidth of 20 KB per second exceeds the upstream 
bandwidth considerably but decreases the overall security. However, Infranet is still far more 
sophisticated than any of the other information hiding techniques [15]. 
1.9 Network Traffic Analysis Metrics 
Infranet and the TCP time stamp method are designed to account for channel 
symmetry measurement [8][15]. Typically, the amount of downstream data far exceeds the 
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amount the client sends to the server. Therefore, changes to channel symmetry by an 
information hiding scheme can be detected through network analysis. 
The Infranet project also accounts for the statistical relationship between application 
layer messages. A Web request is only sent as a cover message if the web request has a high 
probability of occurrence naturally. Clearly, these two metrics are important to abide by for 
any application layer hiding technique. 
However, many other metrics are possible for traffic analysis. We suggest a few more 
in the following list which is far from exhaustive: 
• Communication Duration: clients and servers likely communicate for some definable 
threshold time period. 
• VO Timing Issues: the correspondence between the arrival time of socket messages and 
human keyboard entry could be measured. 
• Occupation: human beings need time to analyze the output of server responses. 
Traffic analysis using the metrics above could possibly detect the use of current 
application layer hiding techniques and those yet to be developed. However, should those 
metrics become widely adopted, covert messaging projects will likely be adapted to respect 
the metrics and further the arms race. 
We establish the foundation for another application layer hiding scheme in the section 
that follows. The previous metrics, including those defined in [8][15], are ignored, as the goal 
of this work is not create an infallible hiding method. 
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CHAPTER 2. HYPOTHESIS 
2.1 Hypothesis Overview 
Current active wardens are insufficient for blocking covert communications. We 
propose that bitwise summations of application layer messages be used to communicate 
covertly. Our bitwise sum method will add further proof to the deficiencies of active wardens 
while holding advantages over several of the other application layer techniques: 
• The bitwise summation method will not use redundancy of any kind. Therefore, an active 
warden cannot canonicalize data to defeat our technique as with Hydan or word synonyms. 
• Cryptography will be employed in a novel way so that message statistics are not 
detectably altered as with the SSH methods. 
• Our scheme is general enough to be applicable to numerous application layer protocols. 
The network drive method cannot function outside of disk sharing protocols. 
• The receiver need not posses knowledge of a message's content prior to transmission. 
Therefore, covert communications could take place outside of a networked environment -
perhaps in digital radio communications or even on paper. Infranet relies on the receiver 
and sender sharing a message set. 
• Bidirectional messaging may be possible in future work. Word synonyms, the SSH 
methods, and Hydan can send messages in both directions. However, the usefulness of 
SSH in information hiding is marginal, and the other two hiding techniques could be 
prevented theoretically. 
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2.2 Bitwise Summation Theory 
The bitwise summation method assigns one or more covert bits to each application 
layer message (the cover). The basic process involves summing all the bits of a socket 
message in base 2 to produce a large integer in base 10 that losslessly represents all of the 
bits. The summation of the message is compared against a reference summation to create 
covert bits. 
The reference summation is the maximum summation possible - in other words, a 
message equal in length to the application layer message but with all the bits set (entirely 
composed of 12s). The reference summation is divided into several intervals. The covert bit 
value of the application layer message is whichever interval encapsulates the message's sum. 
Alice, then, just has to choose the ordering of messages so that the bit values communicate 
the covert bits she wishes to send to Bob. The bitwise summation process is shown in Figure 
5 on the next page and a more formal description follows. 
1) Let M be the number of message bits of the application layer message. Let X be the last bit 
of M, so each bit in M lies in M0 ..• Mx. We compute the summation S of our message 
through Equation 2.1. 
x 
Equation 2.1 s = "' M 2Y L... y. 
y=O 
2) Let I, the number of intervals, be a power of two positive integer such that 2(X+ 'l >I;::: 2 
where 2(x +I) is the summation of the reference value plus 1 to account for the zero value. 
The value of the first interval is [0,1'1] and the rest (l\_1, I'i]. Equation 2.2 on the next page 
demonstrates how to compute all intervals. 
Equation 2.2 
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J'i = ( 2X + I . i ) - } 
I 
wherei=l, ... ,l 
Socket message summation 197 
[L]ol1 lololol1 l1 I 
20 + 22 + 26+27 
Reference summation 255 (0 included) 
li_I1I1I1I1I1I1I1 I 
20+21+22+23+24+25+26+27 
Reference summation divided into 4 intervals 
0-63 64-127 128-191192-255 
00 01 10 11 
Covert bits 11 191 
Figure 5 - Example Bitwise Summation 
3) The covert message bits C are defined to be the the I'i that encapsulates S, as shown in 
Equation 2.3 below. 
Equation 2.3 C = I'i s.t. l\_1 < S s l'i where i > 1 or 0 s S s I', where i = 1 
Mapping intervals into bits is a somewhat arbitrary process. Intervals can be assigned 
values in I! different ways. The most natural would be to let the first interval be assigned the 
bit value 02 and start counting upward. For instance, with 4 intervals, we have 2 covert bits by 
equation 2.4. below. The first interval would be assigned 002, the second 012, the third 102, 
and the fourth 1 h Of course, the assignment of bits to intervals is a possible randomization 
vector for an implementation of the bitwise hiding method. 
Equation 2.4 bits per message = logi(I) 
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2.2.1 Practical Band"Yidth Limitations 
Seemingly, the bandwidth in Equation 2.4 is only constrained by the number of 
intervals chosen. However, the number of intervals possible is going to be bound by the 
number of application layer messages available to the sender. Even if messages could 
somehow be divided into perfect intervals, one message would be necessary for each interval 
in order to convey all the bits. In the case of 4 intervals, at least 4 unique cover messages are 
needed for communication. 
The total number of covert bits is practically confined to to be between 1 and 2 bytes. 
For instance, if the sender wishes to have a 32 bit bandwidth, well over 4 billion cover 
messages are necessary. Even a 16 bit message requires a sizeable amount of covers. Cover 
messages thus form a practical upward bound on the covert bandwidth. Our covert 
bandwidth, tho~gh, still fares well when compared with the bandwidth of other information 
hiding techniques. 
2.2.2 Effect of Syntax and Semantics 
Application layeI" messages follow protocol rules. Thus, messages of the same 
protocol are similar in content. Consequently, we surmise that bitwise summations will be 
similar for messages of the same protocol. However, Equation 2.2 divides summations into 
equal intervals. If most messages fall into the same interval range, communications cannot 
occur. We propose two solutions to handle similar summations that involve the skewing of 
intervals and the use of cryptography. 
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2.2.3 Ad-Hoc Interval Method 
We propose examining bitwise summations to derive a set of intervals that are skewed 
to compensate for the similarity of application layer data. For instance, suppose we have a 
reference summation of 10010 and the number of intervals chosen by the sender and receiver 
is 4. The first interval may assigned to be 0-15, the next 16-45, followed by 46-92, and 93-
100 last. Instead of each interval being a fixed size, interval sizes vary to account for similar 
bitwise summations. 
The ad-hoc method is based on the assumption that socket messages differ in bit 
locations that can be identified. In the case of Web data, perhaps all queries begin to 
differentiate after the "http://www" in the GET method. One large interval could be assigned 
to "http://www" and several intervals for what follows. Of course, appropriate skewing 
values will have to be determined for different application layer protocols and likely for 
specific servers as well. 
2.2.4 Cryptographic (Blind) Interval Method 
An effect of cryptography is that it tends to redistribute symbols in a dataset 
approximately equiprobably. We hypothesize that cryptography's redistributing effect can be 
used to contrive a dataset to fit into equal intervals. First, a dataset would be encrypted. Then, 
a bitwise summation of the encrypted dataset would be computed. Because the summation is 
derived from equiprobable symbols, the summation should also be distributed equiprobably. 
Therefore, Equation 2.2 applies again without any interval skewing being necessary. 
The cryptography method should work for all datasets without the sender having to be 
aware of the bitwise characteristics of the data. Consequently, unlike the ad-hoc method, the 
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blind method is not tightly bound to a particular protocol or server. However, cryptography 
likely introduces substantial overhead. The trade-off between extensibility and efficiency will 
be explored in the following section. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
3.1 Data Sample 
Given the legal and privacy issues surrounding analysis of application layer messages, 
data samples were necessarily selected from public sources - namely, the Association for 
Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on Data Communications' (ACM SIGCOMM) 
Internet Traffic Archive. The Internet Traffic Archive is a repository of packet data which 
consists primarily of HTTP communications. While the dataset is voluminous, the 
information is somewhat dated having last been updated around the start of the year 2000. 
The Internet Traffic Archive does contain packet traces with non-HTTP application 
layer data, but the sanitization operations performed during collection on those other packets 
were extreme. Therefore, the non-HTTP traffic in the archive is not useful in the context of 
measuring packets for bitwise summation statistics [16]. 
The Clarknet dataset was selected from among several of the Internet Traffic 
Archive's Web logs. Clarknet is an Information Service Provider (ISP) located in Maryland. 
The ISP's archive was chosen for analysis because of the sample size and format. 
Data samples were collected in September of 1995 over a course of two weeks, as 
opposed to some of the other archives which span from only a few hours to several months. 
Additionally, the Clarknet Web logs leave the client HTTP requests intact, while most 
Internet Traffic Archive sets contain only server responses [17]. 
3.1.1 Data Limitations 
Unfortunately, Clarknet HTTP requests have headers such as Content-Type and 
Accept stripped off [18]. The header censorship thus taints analysis but only slightly. When 
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attempting to transmit messages using bitwise values, summations can be performed only on 
the actual HTTP request. In other words, Clarknet data is still useful if future datasets based 
on Clarknet results are contrived to match the format of the ISP's logs. 
Clarknet logs were altered using the standard Unix cut and sort utilities to remove 
redundant queries and extraneous information. 39,331 unique queries were extracted for a 
total of roughly 2 Megabytes (MB) of data. Queries ranged in size up to nearly 1,800 bytes, 
but the average size was only 22 bytes. 
3.2 Clarknet Testing Overview 
Tests were designed to compare the effectiveness of the two bitwise summation 
messaging schemes. As mentioned earlier, ad-hoc interval generation derives interval sizes 
through mathematical analysis of the data. The blind (cryptographic) method pre-encrypts 
socket messages before computing bitwise summations so that sums are redistributed roughly 
equiprobably. 
All of the follovv·ing tests were conducted on one machine that is modest by today's 
standards. Particularly, the system had a single 1 GHz Pentium processor with 512 MB of 
RAM and ran version 3.6 of the OpenBSD operating system. 
3.3 Ad-Hoc Interval Tests 
3.3.1 Even Intervals 
As a baseline test, the entire socket message length was used to perform a bitwise 
summation. The interval boundaries were set equal as is always the case with the blind 
method. Test software was designed to output the bit value that would be assigned to an 
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interval. For instance, in the case of 16 intervals, 4 bits are produced, so a given socket 
message would output a decimal number between 0 and 15 inclusive. 
Of course, given that Web queries share a common syntactic structure, the test was 
expected to fail for large interval values. However, the assumption that messages could be 
divided into smaller bit values such as 1 bit without skewing, seemed a reasonable 
expectation. Yet, all interval values tested, from 2 to 65,536 inclusive, yielded only 0 bit 
values. The syntactic nature of Web queries had an even stronger effect on the bitwise 
summations than anticipated. 
Figure 6 on the next page clarifies the reason that the various HTTP requests 
produced only a single bit value. The summations are plotted as a percentage of the 
maximum sum possible. In other words, if the message's sum were 10,00010 and the message 
2 bytes, the message would be 15% of the maximum possible. The scatter plot shows that the 
majority of the queries are 19% of their maximum possible sum. Clearly, intelligent skewing 
is necessary if the ad-hoc method is to have any success. 
3.3.2 Bit Division Test 
In determining hm.v much or how little to skew interval boundaries, the large amount 
of data contained inside a bitwise summation becomes problematic. Ideally, every message's 
summation would be displayed on a comparative histogram. Because that approach proved to 
be impractical, a less precise method was adopted. 
Socket messages 'Were broken up into intervals based on the largest bit value the 
messages contained. In other words, each bit in a message was examined starting at the 
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beginning of the message and proceeding toward the end. One more than the position of the 
last 1 bit in the message was recorded. 
This procedure breaks messages into a series of ranges : sums less than 21 (0-1 ), 22 (2-
3), 23 ( 4-7), 24 (8-15), etc. Figure 7 on the next page shows Clarknet requests divided into 
intervals according to the position of the last set bit. 












Figure 6 - Clarknet Sums as a Percent of Maximum Summation 
3.3.3 16 Intervals Test 
Visual analysis of Figure 7 reveals that the Clarknet data can be subdivided in several 
ways. Table 1 on the following page is a series ofranges that were plainly visible from Figure 
7. Certainly, a larger bandwidth is possible by further subdividing [O, 3000), but the 16 
interval test was conducted merely to gauge whether skewing intervals is at all possible. 
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Figure 8 below plots the total number of messages of each of the bit values after the 
application of the bit ranges in Table 1. Although the message division is far from optimal, 
each of the bit values, from 0 to 15, is represented by at least one Clarknet request. Therefore, 
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Figure 8 - Total Messages in 16 Ad-hoc Intervals 
• 
After the success of the 16 intervals test, testing of the ad-hoc method was abandoned 
for several reasons - the salient one being that the test results are not generalizable in any 
way. Clarknet requests may differ from those of other websites and certainly differ from the 
data in application layer messages of another protocol. Plus, some preliminary testing 
suggested the blind method was more practical and certainly more generalizable. 
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3.4 Blind (Cryptographic) Interval Tests 
3.4.1 Cryptographic Benchmark 
The first blind method test involved benchmarking the overhead of pre-encrypting 
messages. The Twofish algorithm was selected because it was a top qualifier in the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) contest [19]. A simple software driver was written using 
libmcrypt to encrypt the entire Clarknet dataset then decrypt it [24]. Output Feedback Mode 
(OFB), which has a block size of 1 byte (equivalent to a stream cipher), was selected to 
maximize efficiency, as the goal of pre-encryption is to alter the data's statistical properties 
and not to produce confidentiality. 
The standard Unix time utility reported that reading in the 2 MB Clarknet data file, 
encrypting, then decrypting took 4.2 seconds total. Clearly, the overhead of encrypting and 
decrypting is not significant - especially since the Clarknet dataset is likely much larger than 
a set of cover messages would be in practice. However, further testing was necessary to 
determine the efficacy of this method. 
3.4.2 Bit Division Test 
The Two fish version of the encrypted Clarknet dataset was divided according to the 
last 1 bit with the same code as the ad-hoc method. Figure 9 on the following page illustrates 
the test's results. The summations are apparently more evenly distributed with only a few 
peaks and valleys. While Figure 9 indicates that dividing summations by equal boundaries 
may work, more testing was necessary. 
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Figure 9 - Encrypted Clarknet Divided by 1 Bit 
3.4.3 Message Independence Notes 
While the previous test results are accurate and suggest that the cryptographic solution 
is viable, a practical difficulty arose during implementation. Modem cryptographic 
algorithms use an initialization vector (IV) which permutes the algorithm per each use. The 
IV thus heavily impacts the strength of cryptography. The previous tests used a single IV 
across the covers as is normally the case but using only one IV proved ineffective during 
implementation. 
The reason multiple initialization vectors are necessary is the sender and receiver do 
not share a set of covers. This creates a problem as the results of current cipher operations 
depend upon previous cipher operations for most cryptographic modes. Therefore, all of the 
covers cannot simply be encrypted together under a single IV. The receiver can get an IV 
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offline but cannot knovv how the covers were arranged when encrypted, since the covers will 
be sent in a different order. Fortunately, a few solutions exist. 
The sender could transmit ordering information offline but doing so necessitates a 
shared message set, which we wish to avoid. Alternatively, each message could be treated 
independently using the same IV. In other words, each message is individually encrypted with 
the results of the encryption of one message having no impact on the encryption of 
subsequent messages. Of course, using a single IV dramatically weakens cryptography, so 
multiple IVs are clearly needed to properly redistribute summations. The solution chosen was 
to encrypt each cover individually with its own initialization vector. 
In order for each message to have its own IV, the receiver must be able to derive the 
IV from the cover. Also, the IV should be fairly random so that messages rarely share an IV. 
We chose to cryptographically hash each of the cover messages to form IVs. Both the sender 
and receiver can easily compute a secure hash to generate sufficiently random IVs. The tests 
that follow used message digests of the cover messages as initialization vectors. 
3.4.4 21 through 212 Intervals 
In order to gauge the practicality of the cryptographic method conclusively, the 
number of requests that fell into each interval value was recorded for all intervals up to and 
including 212 or 4096 intervals. Testing beyond that range failed consistently as was expected 
with only 39, 331 cover messages. Even boundaries were used as with the first ad-hoc test. 
Essentially, intervals are formed through 2x+i;1 where Xis the last bit in the message and I is 
the number of intervals. The summation of the request is assigned a bit value based on its 
encapsulating interval. 
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In the interest of brevity and for comparison with the ad-hoc method, only the 16 
interval test is shown below. As Figure 10 illustrates, Twofish encryption is very good at 
dividing up the messages evenly. The results were similar for the various interval tests up to 
212 intervals which worked unreliably. Notably, because cryptography has the same 
equalizing effect irrespective of the underlying structure of the data, these tests should apply 
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Figure I 0 - Encrypted Clarknet in 16 Intervals 
3.4.5 Varied Length Tests 
15 
One possible adjustment to the bitwise summation method is to change the length of 
the data operated upon. The previous tests were conducted on the entire Clarknet requests. 
However, a fixed length could certainly be established such as 15 bytes or perhaps a fraction 
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of the message body such as 112 the length. Using a smaller length could cut down on 
computation costs. 
A length of 4 bytes was selected for comparison with the entire request length L. 232-1 
possible values is more than enough to represent all practical interval values reliably. Table 2 
below shows that varying the length yields no computational savings. 
Table 2 
Intervals 4 Byte Length Length L (Entire Request) 
2 01:17 01:15 
-··-····---· 
4 01:01 01 :01 
8 00:56 00:57 
····-·-·---
16 00:55 00:55 
-·--·-·· 
32 00:54 00:53 
64 00:53 00:53 
-····-···-· 
128 00:54 00:54 
256 00:56 00:55 
-----·-
512 01:01 01:01 
1024 01:08 01:07 
-··-····----· 
2048 01:22 01:22 
4096 01:50 01:50 
*8192 49:00 02:47 
·-
*16384 04:38 04:37 
*32768 09:09 09:00 
·····-----
*65536 16:34 17:07 
·------
A few debugging exercises further demonstrated that the bottle neck was not in the 
summing of message data but in the division of the summation into intervals. Therefore, 
message length had a negligible effect upon division time. In fact, operating on the entire 
message was slightly faster on a few occasions. 
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Notably, computing interval summations became costly, growing approximately by a 
power of 2, after 8, 192 intervals. Although interval division can done offline, larger intervals 
still require a great amount of cover data so that not much more than a byte per message can 
be transmitted. The necessity of a large cover base is reflected in Table 2 by the intervals 
marked with an asterisk. Division of the entire cover messages and the 4 byte subsets into 
those intervals consistently failed to produce a mapping of a cover an interval. 
3.5 Test Conclusions 
The Clarknet ad-hoc tests showed that application layer data messages - at least in the 
HTTP protocol - have very similar summation statistics. Therefore, in order to send any data, 
intervals must be skewed appropriately. We were able to skew intervals in the Clarknet 
dataset by setting intervals to be one more than the last 1 bit in the message. We easily 
created 16 intervals after I bit divisions, and more intervals could have been identified with a 
bit more work. 
Unfortunately, our ad-hoc method might not work in some rare situations -
particularly, when all messages of an application layer protocol are of a fixed length and 
have a terminating field. Then, messages would have their last 1 bit in the same position. A 
new means of dividing up payload data would be needed to handle that special case. 
The blind (cryptographic) tests demonstrated the efficacy of pre-encrypting data. In 
just a few seconds, a powerful cipher was able to completely encrypt and decrypt the whole 
Clarknet dataset. Moreover, we were able to transmit as many as 11 bits per application layer 
message reliably. Unfortunately, forming intervals takes a considerable amount of time after 
about 213 intervals, but computations can be performed offline. 
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Interestingly, fixing the length of messages had no apparent effect on computation 
time. While our tests had a short average length of 22 bytes per message, truncating the 
length of datasets with larger cover messages would likely yield only minor time reductions. 
Computing summations is a fast operation, while dividing a summation into intervals is slow 
beyond 213 intervals. 
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CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1 Implementation Overview 
Construction of a proof-of-concept client/server system based upon the Clarknet 
results began with the following goals: 
• The client should function without requiring super-user privileges. A larger user base is 
possible when root access to a system is not a requirement. 
• The system should be secure against current automated statistical attacks (such as those 
used in IDS'es) but not against perceptual attacks. Designing a system impervious to a 
human being visually scrutinizing client/server interactions is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
• Confidentiality should exist for the covert message. The secret communication should be 
encrypted in case an adversary suspects packets are ordered based on bitwise summations. 
• Message integrity must be preserved. If an attacker can modify messages undetected, the 
security of the system is compromised. 
• Communications must have plausible deniability. In other words, the statistics of 
individual messages should not be disturbed, as they would be in the presence of 
cryptography. The data must appear legitimate statistically. 
• The system need only be unidirectional. Making the system operate bidirectionally 
properly requires a client/server probability model and other heuristics specific to an 
individual server and its protocol. 
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4.2 System Call Interposition with libintercept 
Creating a system that is plausibly deniable is straightforward. Regular Internet traffic 
can be captured and replayed based on bitwise sums so that messages look "normal". 
However, allowing non-privileged users to communicate complicates message collection 
somewhat. The kernel cannot be modified so as to permit tracing of socket messages without 
superuser permissions. However, a couple of conceptually simple alternatives exist: 
• A packet capture utility that will operate without the Network Interface Card (NIC) in 
promiscuous mode can be used. Capturing cover messages only requires interception of 
messages intended for the server, not messages from other machines on the network. 
• A method known as system call interposition is possible, where a dynamically linked 
library containing functions with the same names as the libc interface to the system calls 
can be preloaded. The preloaded function names will replace the libc wrappers. Of course, 
an application must not be statically linked. 
System call interposition was chosen as the method is more generic than packet 
sniffing. Interposition hijacks socket calls prior to the TCP/IP stack's handling of the data. 
Therefore, message data is captured in a proper and whole form. Trying to sniff packets and 
then extract the application layer data would require knowledge of the specific protocol to 
parse out application data as well as replicating much of the functionality of TCP/IP. 
A library written in the C programming language called libintercept was written to 
capture socket data. The code is based on skeleton code and accompanying discussion found 
on Dr. Gustavo Rodriguez--Rivera's Spring 1996 Distributed Systems course [22]. System call 
interposition details as 'Well as some of the more complicated methods of snooping on system 
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calls are detailed in two early 1990s papers [20][21]. Figure 11 below shows system call 
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4.3 System Design 
The system shO\vn in Figure 12 on the subsequent page illustrates how a client/server 
system would operate that employs either the ad-hoc method or the pre-encryption method to 
blindly form intervals. The aforementioned goals of confidentiality and integrity are met by 
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Figure 12 - Bitwise Summation Client/Server Model 
4.3.1 Client 
I) The client must agree with the sever offline on a secret key k, the length L of message data 
to operate on, and the number of intervals I by which to divide the data. Unless cover 
messages are very large, L can probably be set to the length of each packet. 
2) Collect a series of cover messages of a particular application layer protocol using 
lib intercept. 
3) If boundaries are to be computed, step through all the bit positions computing 
summations. Mark bits that encapsulate one or more messages as an interval value. 
Otherwise, encrypt the cover data with k and then compute interval summations. 
4) Take the covert message the sender wishes to transmit and compute a message digest of 
the covert message. 
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5) Encrypt the message digest and covert message with a secret key. The previous k can be 
reused or another key can be chosen for enhanced security. 
6) Extract however many bits from the encrypted digest/message the designated amount of 
interval boundaries allows. For 2 intervals, extract 1 bit, for 4 intervals 2 bits, for 8 
intervals 3 bits, and so on. 
7) Choose a cover message that has a summation that falls within an interval range that 
conveys the same bits as those extracted. A simple example is in the case of 4 intervals. In 
order to send 001, a message in the 1st interval should be chosen, the 2nd for 012, the 3rd 
for 102, and the 4th for l lz. 
8) Repeat the previous two steps until the checksum and message are sent in their entirety. 
4.3.2 Server 
1) Parse out an application layer message and compute the interval summation. For the pre-
encryption method, first encrypt the message then compute the sum. 
2) Determine what range the computed bit value falls into. Essentially, this step is the inverse 
of the client's step 7. With four intervals, ifthe range is the 1st interval, a 002 should be 
output. If the range is the 2nd interval, a 012 should be output and so on. 
3) Repeat the previous two steps until the message digest and covert message are completely 
retrieved. 
4) Decrypt the message digest of the covert message and the covert message itself. 
5) Compute the message digest of the decrypted covert message and compare against the one 
transmitted by the sender. 
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4.4 Interval Com1n1tation Subtleties 
Although choosing only intervals that are a power of two removes the difficulty of 
transmitting bit values with a fractional part, a couple of other similar issues arose during 
implementation testing. The first is that the smallest value modem computers store is eight 
bits. With interval values like 32 that produce a number of bits that is not a factor of eight (5 
bits in this case), the covert data bits may not be evenly divisible by the number of interval 
bits. For example, a 32 bit message cannot be divided evenly into 5 bits. However, exactly 5 
bits must be transmitted per message. 
The solution chosen was to have the client add Os to pad the transmissions to the 
nearest byte. A simple example is in the case of a 16 bit covert message transmitted with 
messages divided into 8 intervals (3 bits a piece). If the covert message is "HI" (decimal 72 
and 73 in ASCII), then the binary representation of the covert string is 00010010100100102 • 
Since 3 bits must be sent at a time, the binary string is divided into 3 bits as follows : 000 100 
101 001 001 0. Since 16 bits cannot be divided into 3 bits evenly, this produces the single 0 
at the string's end that must be expanded into 3 bits by adding 2 more Os of padding. The final 
binary string is 000 100 101 001 001 000. 
Of course, the receiver has to take special care to account for the sender's padding. 
One method would be to compute a series of message digests of the received covert data to 
detect the beginning of the padding and truncate that information. However, this approach is 
too computationally intensive. Instead, a simple scheme was devised in which the sender 
encodes the number of bytes prior to the transmission. Figure 13 on the next page shows the 
covert message packet format with embedded lengths. 
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Packet Fonnat for Covert Messages 
[length l message digest l covert message 
4 bytes 32 bytes variable up to 232 -1 bytes 
Figure 13 - Bitwise Summation Packet Format 
4.5 tcphalm/tcphalmd 
A covert client/server information hiding system was implemented in C++ for 
demonstrative purposes .. Called tcphalm and tcphalmd, which stand for hide application 
layer messages, the code and associated Makefiles may be made available publicly later. 
Given the efficiency and accuracy of the pre-encryption method, only that method was 
implemented. Building intervals in an ad-hoc fashion is left as a future work. 
A few supporting libraries are needed to perform bitwise summations, encrypt data, 
and compute a message digest. The C++ wrapper for the prevalent GNU Multiple Precision 
(GMP) library enables summation construction [23]. Libmcrypt, a popular and extensive C 
cryptography library, \Vas chosen to encrypt and decrypt data [24]. Finally, the SHA2 
OpenBSD functions were used to compute a message digest for reasons of expediency. 
Currently, tcphalm and tcphalmd only support stream ciphers or block ciphers with a 
block size of 1 byte. Disallowing block sizes beyond 1 byte simplified implementation 
considerably. However, block ciphers could harden security in future implementations with 
some performance trade offs. 
In addition to the cryptographic limitations, the tcphalmd server was only made to 
support Web traffic for time considerations. While the client, tcphalm, need not be aware of 
the structure of application layer messages, tcphalmd must know the protocol details in order 
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to reconstruct messages delivered by TCP. Web messages were chosen because of their high 
volume and the previous testing on Clarknet data. 
The client/server system was tested only with version 3.6 of the OpenBSD operating 
system, but the code should run on any Unix variant for which GMP and libmcrypt are 
available with minimal modifications. The greatest alteration necessary would be to compute 
a message digest in a more generic form. Windows compatibility may also be possible with 
Cygwin installed [25]. 
4.6 Detection and Attacks 
Several means exist for administrators to detect and attack the current incarnation of 
tcphalm. The most obvious is that the statistical relationship between messages of an 
application layer protocol is not taken into account. For instance, Web queries tend to follow 
a logical ordering. A real user would not go to a linked page of a website without first visiting 
the referrer. Therefore, network traffic analysis software could be designed to determine the 
relationship between app 1ication layer messages. Because tcphalm does not respect that 
relationship, its use can be detected easily. 
Also, traffic analysis techniques to pick out autonomous agents would break tcphalm. 
We provided some exarnp les in the Network Traffic Analysis Metrics section. Basically, a 
warden could identify tcphalm traffic by determining how the flow differs from real traffic. 
For example, a real user would generally pause for a period of time after receiving a website 
to read the contents. Currently, tcphalm delivers requests instantaneously, not staggered. The 
autonomous nature of tcphalm undoubtedly creates many other detectable network traffic 
anomalies. 
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Finally, tcphalm is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack in both directions - the 
upstream and downstream. An active warden could prevent upstream communications by 
modifying the client to server requests in some way that does not break service. For example, 
Web queries often identify the type of Web browser. A warden could insert random and 
fallacious client types into Web requests to invalidate bitwise summations. Of course, 
tcphalm could in turn be modified to only operate on the bytes which cannot be modified 
without destroying service such as URLs. Naturally, the arms race principle applies here as 
well. 
Should downstream communications be added to tcphalm in the future, the 
aforementioned technique of tampering with messages would apply from server to client as 
well. However, another man-in-the-middle attack exists for the downstream. The server could 
change responses in some way that conveys to users that they need to take an arbitrary course 
of action or face consequences. 
For example, a 'Warden could randomly append images into Web responses that 
instruct users to visit an administrative website and verify that they are not running a tcphalm 
client. Of course, such an attack inconveniences users and would only be appropriate in a 
high-security environment. Moreover, tcphalm could be modified to allow users to watch 
application layer responses as they wait for covert transmissions to complete. 
Again, for every counter-measure to covert messaging, there appears to be a counter-
counter measure. The level of sophistication of IDS'es as well as the amount of counter-
detection techniques incorporated into tcphalm in the future will determine how well the 
system fares in the am1s race. As of this writing, tcphalm has the edge over publicly available 
systems. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
5.1 Future Work 
A UDP version of tcphalm would be useful. Seeing how well bitwise summations 
work with protocols such as DNS would be very interesting. More importantly, however, is 
the development of a statistical model for socket messages that can be applied across 
protocols. Such a model would help both causes - either disabling tcphalm or making the 
program more resistant to perceptual analysis. For serious covert communications, such as 
government or military, a statistical model is imperative. 
A great amount of work remains in identifying metrics to gauge the legitimacy of 
network traffic. In other words, research is needed to better differentiate human traffic from 
covert communications. Only a small sample of metrics are listed in the Network Traffic 
Analysis Metrics section. While application layer hiding techniques like Infranet and tcphalm 
may be adapted to use new metrics as well, the high bar can certainly be set much higher. 
Also, a keyed message digest could probably supplant bitwise summations to hide 
information. Certainly, the code would be simpler to implement than tcphalm. However, 
testing is necessary to appraise the validity and security of message digests to communicate 
covert bits. 
Finally, we've ignored the issue of multiple senders and multiple receivers. The 
• 
tcphalm system may benefit greatly from a distribution among many peers. Particularly, the 
covert bandwidth and message secrecy could be improved. Plus, many senders creates a 
sizeable amount of chaff that further confuses analysis. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
Network-based information hiding schemes have been designed for all layers of the 
TCP/IP protocol suite. However, well-designed application layer techniques offer the most 
resistance to active wardens by far. Thus, we've established the theoretical basis for a new 
information hiding technique that is impervious to current active wardens while being general 
enough to support several application layer protocols. 
Our information hiding method involves the use of bitwise summations. All the bits 
of a socket message are added up. The resulting summation is compared against a reference 
summation which is the summation the socket message would have if all of its bits were set. 
The reference summation is then divided into a series of numbered intervals based on a 
divisor that is known to both the sender and receiver. The socket message is assigned the bits 
of the interval by which it is encapsulated. The bandwidth, then, is log2( divisor), but the 
number of cover messages imposes a practical limitation of just a few bytes. 
Because of the similarities in syntax and semantics among application layer messages, 
the summations are likely very similar. Therefore, two methods were devised to compensate 
for the summation similarities. The first, the ad-hoc method, creates intervals based on the 
summation statistics of a particular message set. The second, the cryptographic method, 
applies cryptography to a dataset so that summations fall into intervals roughly equally. 
The Clarknet ISP's dataset, taken from the Internet Traffic Archive, was used to test 
the ad-hoc and cryptographic methods. The ad-hoc method appears to be viable, as 16 
intervals were generated easily from the Clarknet dataset. However, the results cannot be 
generalized. The encrypted method demonstrated superiority by dividing up socket messages 
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into intervals quickly fr1r 213 intervals and less. The results of cryptographic method should 
hold irrespective of the type of cover data. 
Following the Clarknet tests, a client/server communications model was designed that 
uses the bitwise summation method for application layer information hiding. A prototype 
called tcphalm (hide application layer messages) was built to prove the model's validity. The 
tcphalmd server currently only supports the HTTP application layer protocol but more 
protocols can easily be added in the future. 
Assigning covert bits to application layer messages based on bitwise summations is a 
viable means of covert n1essaging. Covert messages can be encrypted without altering the 
statistical properties of the cover messages. Moreover, because bitwise summations are 
computed, the sender and receiver need not share a message set beforehand. Consequently, 
bitwise summations can be used in a large number of application layer protocols. No other 
application layer hiding technique offers as much versatility. 
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